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Association for Communal Harmony in Asia (ACHA) Article of the Month Deal With the Devil: Negotiating the Threat of TerrorismBy Paul Wallace & Sean McDonnell* University of Missouri Peace Studies Review, Room 53 McReynolds Hall, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, MO 65211 “You don’t make peace with friends. You make peace with enemies.”-Yitzhak Rabin (Sederberg, 1995, p. 1) Abstract: The prevailing conventional wisdom suggests that states should not respond to non-state terrorism with negotiation or conciliatory strategy. These resolution methods, the argument goes, will only serve to legitimate and encourage the violence of non-sovereign groups. This assumption, however, is inconsistent with the growing understanding of terrorism and scholarly research in situations of conflict involving non-sovereign entities. In reality, terrorist actors usually have clear and finite political objectives as motivators for conflict. The existence of these objectives provides a framework from which negotiation strategies can proceed. Negotiation is statistically more successful in resolving terrorist-like conflict than popular notion would suggest. Terrorism, and the tactic of intimidating civilian populations, is hardly a novel development in the history of human conflict. After the Romans razed Carthage in 146 BC, they salted the earth to ensure the domestic population would be forced to either migrate or starve. Every political assassination from Julius Caesar’s in ancient Rome to Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s in 20 th century Sarejevo can fall under some definition of terrorism. Truly, as is written in Ecclesiastes, “Nihil novi sub sole.” There is nothing new under the sun. But modern terrorism movements, particularly in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center , have attracted more scholarly and political attention than ever before. This attention is warranted by a unique confluence of factors that have made terrorist movements more potentially influential than ever before. These include: post-imperial nationalism and ethnic identity movements; cultural schisms within major religious movements with implications for secular governments; technological advancements that allow for immediate global communication; armaments that allow small groups to inflict large damage or casualties (weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or large conventional explosives); and a post-Cold War global dynamic that allows nation states to focus on the actions of non-state actors, and vice versa. “The guiding premise behind this collection of case studies is that terrorism as a general phenomenon cannot adequately be explained without situating it in its particular political, social and economic context (Crenshaw, 1995). Terrorism is inexorably political. Even the term has political impact. As the clichéd argument goes, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” The most widely agreed upon definition of terrorism is based on the targets and practices rather than the motives. “Terrorist” is usually applied to groups or individuals that engage in violent action, often conducted against civilians or noncombatants, in ways inconsistent with conventional interstate warfare. States have engaged in terrorist methods in the past, e.g. Nazi Germany and post World War II Argentina , and continue to do so in the present. Nevertheless, the most frequent manifestations of terrorist action, particularly on the global scale, tend to involve ethnic, religious, or cultural group action without the sanction of a state actor, although some states can and do support terrorist actions in unofficial capacities. Ethnic and religious motivations so often provide the impetus for terrorist action that sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer suggests rejecting the term “terrorism” and opts instead to use “symbolic violence” borne out of “cultures of violence” (2003, p. 14). In most instances, terrorists are actors in a position of relatively little power using available violent methods to cause a policy change on the part of larger more powerful state actors. Terrorists usually are not sadistic madmen nor madwomen. They tend mostly to be rational beings with clear, though extreme, political agendas who view violence as a means of attaining those agendas. Indeed, a logical progression of this thinking is that offering alternate means of effecting political change through meaningful negotiation could be a strategy (or tactic) for averting or curtailing terrorism. Conventional wisdom suggests that regimes should never bargain with terrorists. This preference for coercive and repressive responses rests largely on rhetorical rather than analytical characterizations of the problem of terrorism. If we consider terrorism as one possible tactic available to a challenger group engaged in a political struggle we push the question of response back into the political context where it belongs. The two major models of this political context – the war model and the rational actor model – not only fail to preclude conciliatory strategies, they actually incorporate them. (Sederberg, 1995, p. 1) Perhaps there are situations in which conciliatory strategies are not possible or will not result in positive outcomes, but negotiation provides a political solution to the political problem of terrorism. In numerous cases, in fact in the majority of cases in which they are implemented, negotiated settlements result in increased stability and decreased violence. Negotiation strategies should therefore be another tool in states’ arsenals for combating violent political tactics. Negotiation has been implemented as a means to make major breakthroughs in a number of instances, notably, in Northern Ireland , where negotiations between unionist paramilitary groups, the government of Great Britain , and republican nationalist militants advised by the government of Ireland resulted in major reductions of tension. The Good Friday Peace Accords, resulting from the joint negotiations in 1994, effectively ended organized violence in the northern counties and paved a path for political reintegration of the republican Catholic minority into a legitimate autonomous power sharing government. The peace process has stalled of late over the extent to which power will be shared in the Stormont (the North Irish legislature), but the people of the region can now largely live their daily lives without the threat of violence that existed even 15 years ago (Darby, 2003). Negotiation is not without detractors, both for ideological and practical reasons. The argument against negotiation is that you legitimize the militant/terrorist groups. Usually they are first asked to lay down their arms. That can be unrealistic, as they wouldn’t be engaged in political violence if they had sufficient trust. Trust has to be built. That necessitates an emphasis on the political dimensions (Wallace 2002). In addition to ideological reservations about legitimizing terrorists, states that would negotiate also run the practical risk that terrorist actors will use the armistice periods offered by negotiations as opportunities to rearm and regroup, exacerbating subsequent conflict. Such was the situation in Sri Lanka , when the Tamil Tiger movement used the 1995 ceasefire with the Singhalese government simply to regroup and renew conflict with greater strength. At that time, the Tamil Tiger movement became what was arguably the most extreme terrorist movement in history, pioneering the wearing of cyanide tablets in case of capture, the use of women suicide bombers, and the use of child soldiers (Subramanian, 2000). However, even in this extreme instance, subsequent negotiations in 2002 have made some gains toward resolving Sri Lanka’s violent divisions, including an uneasy truce that has held for over two years, the reopening of the country’s major north-south highway connecting Tamil territory with the rest of the island, and limited cooperation between the two warring sides. Clearly, the stakes of negotiation are very high. One possible outcome is a reduction or end to violence, obviously the most advantageous possible result for state actors. However, on the end of the outcome spectrum is the possibility for renewed and worsened conflict, not to mention the credibility a state risks if negotiations are seen as legitimizing violent factions. Is the reward worth the risk? Because we can assume that similar historical situations could have implications for future situations, the obvious question inherent is: does the empirical evidence support the assumption that negotiation results in decreased violence? As already discussed, defining terrorism can be problematic and so gathering empirical evidence can be an arduous process. Most scholars agree that modern terrorist methods tend to coincide with ethnic or religious militancy and conflict (Singh, 2004). Indeed, one is hard pressed to find a single modern example of terrorism without ethnic implications. These include Muslim extremism in al Qaeda; Catholic/Protestant conflict in Ireland ; Israeli (Jewish)/Palestinian (Muslim) conflict in the Middle East ; Hutu/Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi ; Kurdish/Turkish conflict in Turkey ; Pakistani/Indian conflict in Kashmir ; Maoist insurgency in Nepal ; and Tamil/Singhalese conflict in Sri Lanka . Logically, a good place to start looking at the effectiveness of negotiation in alleviating terrorist violence would be in examining negotiation’s success as a tool in ending ethnic conflict. In 1999, Caroline Hartzell compiled a list of every significant civil war from 1945-1997 that was ended by a negotiated settlement. Almost all listed wars were based on ethnic conflict, or political issues relating to ethnicity. The starting point of 1945 is significant because after the end of WW II, imperial empires began to fall to nationalist movements resulting in independence from colonial rule. Hartzell considers a negotiated settlement to have taken place “if representatives from the opposing sides of a conflict met in face-to-face talks to discuss issues and conditions they believed relevant to ending the war” (Hartzell, 1999, p. 20). A stable result is one in which conflict does not relapse within five years of settlement. Where possible, we have updated the data in parenthesis.
Angola : 1989-1991 unstable Angola : 1992-1994 5-year criteria not met at time of study (now stable) Azerbaijan : 1989-1994 5-year criteria not met at time of study (now stable) Bosnia : 1992-1995 5-year criteria not met at time of study (now unstable) Cambodia : 1970-1991 stable Chad : 1979-1979 unstable Chad : 1989-1996 5-year criteria not met at time of study (now stable) Chechnya : 1994-1996 unstable Columbia : 1948-1957 stable Croatia : 1991-1991 unstable Croatia : 1995-1995 5-year criteria not met at time of study (now stable) Cyprus : 1963-1964 unstable Cyprus : 1974-1974 stable Dominican Republic : 1965-1965 stable El Salvador : 1979-1991 stable Georgia (S. Ossetia): 1989-1992 stable Georgia (Abkhazia): 1992-1994 5-year criteria not met at time of study (now mixed) Guatemala : 1968-1996 5-year criteria not met at time of study (now stable) India : 1946-1948 unstable Iraq : 1961-1970 unstable Korea : 1950-1953 stable Laos : 1959-1973 unstable Lebanon : 1958-1958 stable Lebanon : 1975-1989 stable Liberia : 1989-1996 5-year criteria not met at time of study (unstable) Malaysia : 1948-1956 stable Moldova : 1992-1992 stable Morocco : 1975-1991 stable Mozambique : 1981-1992 stable Nicaragua : 1981-1989 stable Philippines : 1972-1996 5-year criteria not met at time of study (unstable) Sierra Leone : 1991-1996 5-year criteria not met at time of study (unstable) South Africa : 1983-1991 stable Sudan : 1963-1972 stable Tajikistan : 1992-1997 5-year criteria not met at time of study (stable) Yemen : 1962-1970 stable Zimbabwe : 1972-1979 stable
(Source: Hartzell, 1999, p. 13)
In 24 of the 38 cases involving ethnic violence and terrorism, negotiated settlement succeeded in achieving peace that lasted at least five years. Five years of peace is a significant success -- some of the conflicts had lasted over 30 years. Based on this historical sample, negotiation is successful in achieving stability and cessation of violence about two-thirds (63 percent) of the time. It is hard to determine the success rate of militarized response to terrorism in the absence of negotiation, but it can be reasonably inferred that success is less than total in the vast majority of cases. Armed escalation of conflict on the part of a state tends to exacerbate the initial violence, as terrorism escalates into a spiral of violence between the state and the movement(s) or into a long-term conflict of attrition between the opposing sides. The recent events in Iraq , Columbia , Kashmir , and Israel would suggest that governmental military response in the absence of negotiation tends to harden, rather than weaken, terrorists and their sympathizers’ political resolve (USIP, 2003). It is important to note that not all negotiations are created equal. Some settlements are much more effective than others. Negotiations with built-in enforcement mechanisms tend to be much more successful than those based solely on the assumption of goodwill and adherence (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Negotiations incorporated in a multifaceted approach that includes social-psychological closure also tend to yield more positive results (Wallace, 2002). Also, the initial implementation of negotiation can result in a temporary increase in violence as extremists attempt to influence negotiation position and agenda or try to derail the process all together, but efforts that endure these initial hardships to reach a settlement are statistically more likely to succeed. Similarly, all conflicts are not created equal, and certain elements seem to be particularly important in creating situations that facilitate negotiation and make conciliatory strategy the most obvious rational course for the state. The case of Northern Ireland , which is not included in the table because the peace process in ongoing, is a particularly compelling study in the struggles and successes that negotiated peace can bring. What is important to note in the case of Northern Ireland are the factors that contributed to the eventual success of the negotiation process. These include: the growth of moderate leadership on both sides of the movement; a politically capable wing of the militant movement in Sinn Fein; a willingness to make items of principle (including disarmament) matters of political discussion; the incorporation of a sovereign advocate for the less powerful militants; and an ultimate commitment to reversing the erosion of democratic institutions. First, a brief background: The partition of the island in 1921 left a North Irish state that was deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines. Eire ’s southern 26 counties (all with clear Catholic majorities) gained independence from Britain in a compromise that resulted in the six northeastern counties remaining within the United Kingdom . Ethnic tensions increased in the late 1960s between the Catholic minority, which perceived itself to be marginalized and systematically alienated by Protestants, and the Protestant majority, which was suspicious of Catholic inclinations toward union with Ireland . Civil rights movements sparked by the Catholic minority clashed with elements of the Unionist Protestant power structure. Britain deployed its army to maintain stability in 1969. The hard-line Catholic nationalists perceived this show of force as an affront to Irish autonomy. This is not surprising considering the history of conflict between Ireland and Britain . In response, militant elements of nationalism developed into the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army), which directly engaged British troops in armed conflict. Militant facets of the Unionist movement also developed, further complicating the situation. The extent to which Unionist militants and British forces worked in concert is unclear. In 1972, as a response to disintegrating stability and a demonstrated inability of local government to exercise control of the situation, the British government dissolved the Northern Irish Parliament and instituted Direct Rule. The conflict continued with varied intensity until 1994, when the peace process began in earnest with Britain initiating peace overtures, and the inclusion of independent Ireland in a consultative brokering position. Finally, decreased local resistance to constitutional resolution and a power-sharing government enabled a meaningful peace process to develop (Darby, 2003). The road to resolution With the Anglo-Ireland agreement of 1994, the British included the independent state of Ireland in an official consultative position in the Northern Irish situation. By incorporating a sovereign state advocate for Catholics in the North, the British implicitly recognized nationalism as a legitimate issue among Catholic citizens of Northern Ireland . This marked a great departure from more fervent direct or indirect support of Unionist factions, ultimately culminating in a situation of shared recognition of citizenship in 1998 in which the northern Irish could declare themselves citizens of either Ireland, Britain, or both. It also paved the way for increased trust in the process for more moderate nationalists. Incorporation had the added benefit of reducing mainstream support -- moral and financial -- for movements within Ireland that called for an immediate united Irish island. Elements within the republican militancy also began to question the benefits of armed conflict. Throughout the 1970s the prevailing attitude among the militant movements was that a protracted war of attrition would eventually result in a weakened British resolve and withdrawal. As decades of conflict appeared to have a largely reverse effect, succeeding only in illegitimating the movement and exacting heavy casualty tolls on the Catholic population, a new generation of more moderate republican leaders emerged, notably Gerry Adams’ 1983 election to the presidency of Sinn Fein. Rather than seeking ultimate unity with Ireland , these new moderates were more willing to accept British proposals that would return a measure of autonomy and incorporate power-sharing in forming a new government. This republican push toward the middle intended to return legitimacy to the Sinn Fein movement. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement was largely possible because of willingness on the part of Sinn Fein to discuss the procedural disarmament of the IRA. Such a decommissioning has yet to fully take place. The major remaining point of contention is the structure and the reinstatement of the Northern Irish Parliament. The IRA seems unwilling to rescind its primary bargaining chip (threat of force) while a system of Direct Rule exists and without assurances of meaningful participation in legitimate government. The Unionist side mirrored the moderate movement in a similar bid to maintain political credibility. The Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party both became major forces on the loyalist side, advocating a reduction in tension, a return to self-rule and even a true instatement of civil rights for Catholic citizens. The primary Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), demonstrated a willingness to make political concessions under the pro-negotiation policies of David Trimble (Darby, 2003). Despite the final glitch of achieving fully recognized disarmament, the process has made major strides toward regaining social integration and stability, including a reformation in Ulster policing policies under the a mutually agreed plan. The plan is aimed to reduce the total size of the domestic police force by almost 25 percent and increase Catholic participation in policing from 8 percent to 30 percent. Social integration in less official settings also has increased since the 1998 ceasefire. According to a 2002 joint study by the University of Ulster and Queen’s University-Belfast, 70 percent of Catholics and 61 percent of Protestants who belong to clubs said their clubs or societies comprised mixed religious membership. Similarly, the majority of professional organizations and fitness activities took place in mixed environments, although golf seemed much more integrated at 81 percent than soccer with 42 percent. Ultimately the study found socioeconomic cleavages to be at least as important in interpersonal association as religion (Murtagh, 2002). As Northern Ireland shows, when properly implemented, with both reliable enforcement and significant efforts to achieve social trust and closure, and in the presence of a proper combination of conditional factors, negotiation is a valid path toward resolving terrorist violence and ethnic conflict. It is also often the most advantageous path for a state to pursue. With a historical success rate of about 63 percent, negotiated settlement may not be the guarantor of a cessation to violence, but it is one of the most potentially effective means available. States often have understandable reservations regarding perceptions of legitimacy or potential success, but negotiation is the natural political solution to what is inherently a political problem. Political enfranchisement can be misinterpreted as legitimizing violence, but a process of incorporation can also put the onus of legitimacy on the terrorist movements. Through continuing violence in the presence of other means of effecting change, terrorists would seem to be sacrificing perceived legitimacy and claim to the moral high ground, rather than gaining it. The degree of legitimacy is the key element shared by the contending sides in targeting the larger society. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in human history. Neither is communication to resolve differences. The next stage of human political history will perhaps hinge on how successful the latter will be in mitigating the former. Bibliography Crenshaw, M. (Ed.) (1995). Terrorism in context. University Park , PA : Pennsylvania State University Press. Darby, J. (2003). Northern Ireland : The background to the peace process. CAIN Project—Incore (Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity). Retrieved March 1, 2006 , from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm. Das, P.M. (2002). Terrorism: The untold story. Chandigarh : Abhishek Publications. Hartzell, C. (1999). Explaining the stability of negotiated settlement in interstate wars. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43, 3-22. Hartzell, C. and Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalizing peace: Power sharing and post-civil war conflict management. American Journal of Political Science , 47, 318-332. Juergensmeyer, M. Terror in the mind of God (3 rd Edition) (2003). Santa Barbara , CA : University of California-Santa Barbara Press. Murtagh, B. (2002). Northern Ireland life and times survey: Research update .Joint Research Project between Queen’s University-Belfast and the University of Ulster . No. 10. Sederberg, P. (1995). Conciliation as counter-terrorist strategy. Journal of Peace Research, 32, 295-312. Subramanian, N. (2000). Frontline, 17(22), October 28-November 10. United States Institute for Peace (2003). Global terrorism after the Iraq War. Annual Report. Washington D.C. Wallace, P.. (2002). Terrorism and a comparative approach toward conflict resolution. Paper presented at the Fourth International Symposium on Ethnic Identities, Political Action in Post-Cold War Europe, Xanthi , Greece , July 6-10. Wallace, P. (2006). Countering terrorist movements in India : Kashmir & Khalistan. In R. Art and L. Richardson (Eds.), Democracy and counterterrorism: Lessons from the past. Washington , D.C. : U.S. Institute for Peace.
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